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One feature of a multi-level operating system is a requirement to manage 
multiple, simultaneous user-sessions at different levels of security. This session 
management is performed through a trusted path between the user and operating system. 
Critical to this functionality is the operating system's ability to temporarily halt dormant 
sessions, thereby ensuring their inability to perform any actions within the system. Only 
when a session must be reactivated are its processes returned to a runnable state. 
This thesis presents an approach for adding this "secure halting" functionality to 
the Linux operating system. A detailed design for modifying the Linux kernel, the core 
of the operating system, is given. A new module, allowing an entire session to be halted 
and woken up, is designed. A new process state, the "secure halt" state, is added. 
Additionally, the kernel's scheduling manager is modified to properly manage processes 
in the secure halt state. The research has led to the implementation of the design as a 
proof of concept. 
This research is meant to be used in combination with other efforts to enhance the 
security of the Linux operating system. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       COMPUTER SECURITY 
Computers are everywhere. They provide useful services in an almost unlimited 
range of areas. Given their widespread use, the importance of computer security cannot 
be understated. Initial attempts at computer security revolved around physically 
protecting the computer. Early computers were rare, large, expensive machines. One 
user at a time would have access to the computer. There was no need to protect one 
user's data from another's as only one user's data was on the computer at any one time. 
Since then, the method of computer use has changed dramatically. 
Modern computers are shared by multiple users. This necessitates protecting one 
user's data from another's. This duty falls on the computer's operating system. An 
operating system is a computer program that sits between the user's programs/data and 
the hardware. One of its primary responsibilities is to accept user requests and decide the 
most efficient manner in which to allocate its resources in order to accomplish the 
request. As part of this responsibility, the operating system must decide if the user is 
authorized access to the requested resource. This duty is known as access control. 
B.       ACCESS CONTROL 
Modern operating systems provide some methodology of protecting users from 
each other and the operating system from the users. This protection is called access 
control. In general, access control requires that the operating system mediate all requests 
by a user wishing to utilize a resource. In a computer, a process executing on behalf of a 
user is known as a subject. An object is something on the system that must be protected, 
i.e. files, printers, ports, etc. 
The reference validation mechanism (RVM) is responsible for validating all 
requests by a subject to access an object. The RVM does this by comparing the security 
attributes of the subject with those of the object. If the access is acceptable in accordance 
with the RVM's rule set, the RVM will allow the access. RVM rule sets fall into two 
major categories: mandatory access control and discretionary access control. 
1. Mandatory Access Control 
In a mandatory access control (MAC) system, each subject and object's security 
attributes are unchangeable. Certain individuals, usually the system administrators, are 
responsible for specifying the security attributes of a newly created user ID. Those 
security attributes specify a range of values. When a user logs on, he selects a value from 
this range. This selected value is given to the user's initial subject when he first logs in. 
2. Discretionary Access Control 
With discretionary access control (DAC) the operating system also enforces a set 
of access rules. The fundamental difference between MAC and DAC is that in a DAC 
system an object's security attributes may be changed during its lifetime. DAC is 
discretionary in that the authority for a subject to access an object is left to someone's 
discretion. In most systems that someone is the user who owns a particular object, 
however, some systems limit this discretion to some other selected individual. The 
owner does not directly allocate access rights to subjects. Rather, the owner allocates 
access rights to specific user IDs. Thus access to resources lies at the discretion of one or 
more individuals. 
C.       IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 
Identification is the process by which an entity informs another entity of their 
existence. Authentication is the process by which one entity proves to another the 
authenticity of the identification. In computers, the most common method of 
identification and authentication is the use of a user ID and a password [GAS88]. The 
operating system prompts the user to enter his user ID. It then prompts the user to enter 
his password. The operating system then looks up the password entry for the supplied 
user ID in an internally maintained database. If the password entry matches the one the 
user supplied, he has successfully logged onto the system. Thus, the user ID is the 
identification and the password is the authentication. 
Clearly, the previous sections on MAC and DAC illustrate the importance of 
accurate identification and authentication. Both systems rely on the user ID to set a 
subject's security attributes. The subject's attributes are then used to determine what 
actions may be performed. If an individual possesses the user ID and password of a 
legitimate user, he can use them to log onto the system. As far as the system is 
concerned, the individual is the legitimate user. After all, he provided the proper 
identification and authentication. While a user's ID is usually not a secret, his password 
is. A user must protect his password. 
D.       THE TRUSTED PATH 
A potential difficulty in protecting a password from disclosure occurs during the 
very time it must be divulged. During the logon procedure, the user must provide both 
his user ID and password. As previously stated, the user ID / password pair is how the 
user identifies and authenticates himself to the operating system. However, has the 
operating system authenticated itself to the user? While the logon prompts may look like 
they have been provided by the operating system's logon process, a user process 
illegitimately masquerading as the logon process may have provided them. This 
masquerading process can steal passwords. Such a process is an example of a "Trojan 
horse." 
A Trojan horse appears to be one thing when it is actually another [PLF97]. 
While it may or may not provide its expected services, it also provides some other service 
that the user does not know about and would not willingly request. A Trojan horse acting 
as the logon process and recording a user ID and password pair is known as a logon 
spoofer. A logon spoofer can store the captured information and/or send it to an 
unauthorized individual. This can result in unauthorized use of the computer system. 
Some method is required to allow the operating system to authenticate itself to the user. 
This method is known as a trusted path. 
A trusted path is a communication channel between the user and the operating 
system. It is invoked through some action initiated by the user that is guaranteed to result 
in communication with the operating system directly. This may take the form of a certain 
combination of keystrokes, as in the XTS-300 or Microsoft Windows NT/2000, or by 
placing the mouse on a certain portion of the screen in a graphical user interface, as in 
Trusted Solaris. The keystroke method of invoking the trusted path is referred to as a 
secure attention key (SAK), because it is a secure method of requesting the operating 
system's attention. On systems that support a trusted path, it must be invoked for actions 
that require communication with security-critical portions of the operating system. Such 
actions may include the previously mentioned process of logging on to the system, 
changing a password, logging off, etc. 
In the subsections that follow, the basic security features of several operating 
systems are summarized. Specific attention is paid to the manner in which a user invokes 
a trusted path and how the operating system ensures that user processes are not able to 
interact with the user during the time that he is communicating with security-critical 
portions of the operating system. Attention is also paid to the manner in which each 
operating system handles simultaneous users. 
1.        Windows NT/2000 
Microsoft Windows NT and Microsoft Windows 2000 are two operating systems 
that enforce a discretionary access control. Both also provide an implementation of a 
trusted path. The SAK for these systems is the pressing of the Ctrl-Alt-Del keys 
simultaneously. This invokes a trusted path to the logon process. Only after these keys 
are pressed does the logon dialog box appear. The user then enters his user ID and 
password and is validated by the system. Note that in Windows 2000 Professional the 
requirement to press the SAK in order to logon is not enabled by default. It is enabled by 
default for the other products, e.g. NT Workstation, NT Server, and 2000 Server. 
Once a user is logged onto the system, security critical communication with the 
operating system is accomplished by pressing the SAK. This displays the "Windows 
Security" dialog box [MICOO]. This consists of an information section which displays 
the 
• User ID 
• Logon date and time 
It also consists of a panel containing the following buttons: 
• Lock Computer - locks the console until the S AK is again pressed and the 
user reenters his password. 
• Log Off - logs the user off of the system. 
• Shut Down - logs the user off of the system and causes the operating 
system to stop all programs, in an orderly manner, so the computer may be 
turned off. 
• Change Password - prompts the user to reenter his old password, for 
confirmation, and type in, twice, a new password. 
• Task Manager - brings up the task manager. The task manager allows the 
user to kill applications or processes and to view system performance 
information. 
• Cancel - returns the user to whatever he was previously doing. 
By requiring a user to press the SAK prior to logging on or changing his 
password, Windows NT/2000 ensures that a logon-spoofing program left by another user 
is not attempting to capture his password. The other actions (i.e., log off, shut down, and 
displaying the task manager) can all be initiated through other means in addition to 
pressing the SAK. 
While multiple users may be simultaneously logged on to a Windows NT/2000 
system, only one user at a time may be logged onto the computer from the physical 
console. The other users must logon to the system via a network connection. For the 
console user, the system ensures that pressing the SAK temporarily halts all screen output 
of running processes during the time that the user is interacting with the trusted path. 
Otherwise, a previous user could leave a trusted path window masquerade program 
executing. 
2.        Trusted Solaris 
Sun's Trusted Solaris 7 provides an implementation of a trusted path on an 
operating system that enforces mandatory access control and discretionary access control. 
Sun has chosen not to require the pressing of a set of keys to invoke a trusted path as part 
of the logon process. All that is required to logon is for the user to enter his user ID in 
one dialog box and then enter his password in another. This method is secure due to the 
trusted path that is present when the user is logged on. When a user is logged on, the 
bottom of the screen has an area known as the "trusted stripe." It displays security 
information, such as the security level of the currently selected window. Whenever the 
mouse cursor is positioned in an area of the graphical user interface that has direct 
communication with the operating system, a trusted path indicator appears at the left end 
of the trusted stripe. Trusted Solaris stops user level processes from drawing over the 
trusted stripe. Therefore, there is no need for a SAK; the user invokes the trusted path via 
mouse placement. The existence of the trusted stripe is the reason that a user process 
cannot spoof the login dialogs. When logging-in, it is the absence of the trusted stripe 
that informs the user that he is being presented with the authentic logon dialogs. As 
cautioned in the Trusted Solaris User's Guide: 
You should never see the Trusted Stripe when the login screen 
appears. If you ever see the screen stripe while attempting to log in or 
unlock the screen, do not type your password because there's a chance you 
are being spoofed, that is, an intruder's program is masquerading as a login 
program to capture passwords. [SUN99] 
Once a user is logged onto the system, the standard list of trusted path options is 
presented when the user clicks the right mouse button in the center of the panel just above 
the trusted stripe. Among the options is one to allow the user to change his password. 
See Figure 1. Once again, this must be done via a trusted interface to ensure a user level 
process is not spoofing the "change password" process. 
Since Trusted Solaris implements mandatory access controls, there are additional 
options, both during login and via the trusted path menu to set security attributes. During 
logon a menu appears allowing the user to select the range of attributes to allow during 





Change Workspace SL 
Assume admin Role 
Assume oper Role 
Assume root Role 
Assume secadmin Role 
Change £assword _, 
Allocate Device 
Query Window Label 
:Shut Down 
;Help 
Figure 1. Trusted Path Menu [SUN99] 
Once the user is logged-on, he may specify the security attributes for future 
windows that he opens. This allows the user to have multiple windows open 
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simultaneously, each with the same or different security settings. However, just like 
Windows NT/2000, only one user can be logged onto the system from the console at any 
one time. 
3.        STOP 
Wang Federal's STOP is a secure operating system developed for the XTS-300. 
It provides an implementation of a trusted path on an operating system that enforces 
mandatory access control and discretionary access control. STOP is a custom-built 
operating system that provides an emulation of the Unix operating system. Unlike either 
Windows NT/2000 or Trusted Solaris, STOP has a text-based trusted path user interface. 
A windowing system, X Window, can be run on top of the operating system, however, 
interactions with the trusted elements of STOP are accomplished with a text-based 
interface. 
For this operating system the SAK is invoked by simultaneously pressing the 
Alt-SysRq keys. The system then displays a welcome message, and prompts the user for 
a user ID and password. Once authenticated, the user is informed of the current security 
attributes and is presented with a standard Unix command prompt. If the user wishes to 
invoke the trusted path the SAK is pressed. This clears the screen and presents the user 
with the trusted menu shown in Figure 2. 
Entering trusted environment at sec lvl 0 int lvl 3 
Detached from process family 1 
Enter command 
9 
Figure 2. STOP Trusted Menu 
Once in the trusted environment, the user can enter any of the following 
commands [WAN98]: 
• cdl - change default level - changes the default security level for the 
user's future logons 
• chd - change home directory 
• cup - change user password 
• disconnect - allows the user to disassociate a specified process family 
from a user session. This allows processes to continue running even if the 
user logs out of the system. 
• fsm - file system management - allows the user to perform various file 
system commands, i.e. change directory, copy file, etc. 
• ikill - immediate kill - immediately terminates all processes associated 
with a process family. 
• kill - initiates termination of all processes associated with a process 
family. The processes are sent a signal informing them that the yare being 
killed. However there is no guarantee that the processes will comply. 
• logout - kills all processes associated with the user that have not been 
disconnected and logs the user out of the system. 
• reattach - reattaches the user to a process family. 
• run - begins execution of a process family. 
• session - displays the status of the current session. 
• sg - set group - sets the group identifier for the current session. 
• si - set level - allows the user to specify the current security attributes 
• system - displays the status of the system 
STOP allows a user to have more than one session open. Each session can have 
security attributes set to a valid value within the user's allowed range. STOP refers to 
each session as a process family. The user can press the SAK, use the si command to 
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change the security level, and execute the run command to start running the new session. 
This process of switching between sessions is more difficult than that provided by 
Trusted Solaris where all that is required is clicking the mouse in a window running the 
desired session. 
E.       SESSION CONTROL 
If an operating system allows multiple user sessions, it must have some method of 
controlling their execution. The XTS-300, with its text-based trusted path interface, 
adopts a technique of completely stopping the execution of a user session. This occurs 
when the session is not "connected" to the console. A specific session is not connected to 
the console when: 
• The user is interfacing with the trusted path. 
• Another session is connected to the console. 
For this technique to work there must be some mechanism enabling the operating 
system to place a process in a "secure halt" state. The operating system can then 
guarantee that secure halted process will not execute and cannot perform any actions, 
including malicious ones. 
F.        SUMMARY 
The remainder of this thesis proposes modifications to the Linux operating system 
that add the ability to secure halt processes and sessions. This will lay the foundation for 
a trusted path that is capable of managing multiple sessions. Note that the resulting 
system, while adding some of the functionality found in the XTS-300, in no way rises to 
the same level of assurance. To do so would require designing an operating system from 
the ground up, with special emphasis on security. 
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The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter II is a high-level design of the secure halt mechanism design. 
• Chapter DI is description of the changes required to the existing Linux kernel 
in order to add a secure halt mechanism. 
• Chapter IV provides a summary of the thesis work, including implementation 
progress, problems encountered, and suggested future research topics. 
• Appendix A provides detailed specifications of the new modules. 
• Appendix B provides a listing of the source code for new modules. 
• Appendix C provides a description of the framework developed to allow 
testing of the secure halt mechanism. 
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II.     PROCESS SECURE HALT MECHANISM DESIGN 
This chapter describes the high-level design of the secure halt mechanism. 
Chapter IH describes the specific changes required to Linux in order to implement this 
design. 
A.       PROCESS STATE MODIFICATIONS 
A process is said to be "secure halted" when it will not execute regardless of other 
system events. An explicit request to "unhalt" the process is the only way that a process 
will return to the normal flow of execution. To understand what is required to achieve 
the secure halt status, it is necessary to understand the lifecycle of a process. 
1.        Standard Process Lifecycle 
The standard lifecycle of a process is shown in Figure 3. 
(^     NEW      J (TERMINATED) 
admitted  \. exit 
S^—""^r 
interrupt 
~~~/^*~     ~^X   / 
(   READY    J (   RUNNING   J 
scheduler dispatch     \»^^    ^^/ 
— __—T    i 
ID or event completion ~~-y~^~      ~~~~-^^^     IIO or event wait 
(SUSPENDED ) 
Figure 3. Typical Process State Diagram [SBL98] 
The states are described as follows: 
•    New - A process that is being created. 
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• Ready - A process that is ready to run. It is waiting for the scheduler to 
assign it to a processor. 
• Running - A process that is executing on a processor. This is the only state in 
which a process is actually "doing" something. 
• Suspended - A process is waiting on some input/output or event. This could 
be keyboard input from the user, a disk read, etc. 
• Terminated - A process that has completed its execution. A process will 
remain in the terminated state until the operating system has determined that 
the process' information is no longer needed 
Adding a secure halt mechanism involves the addition of a new state. This is 
called the secure halt state. 
2.        Fully Connected Secure Halt State Process Lifecycle 
Adding a new state raises the question: What events will cause the process to 
enter and leave the secure halt state? Additionally, what current states will a process be 
allowed to depart in order to enter the secure halt state, and vice versa? Clearly, a 
process in the new or terminated states will not need to enter the secure halt state. In the 
first case, the process is being created with the intent of letting it execute. In the second 
case, the process is finished and will not have a chance to execute again. A possible 
solution is shown in Figure 4. This solution shows that a process can enter from or depart 
to the secure halt state from any of the remaining states: ready, running, or suspended. 
This is called a. fully connected secure halt state. 
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There is a problem with this solution. A process in the suspended state is waiting 
for an I/O operation to complete or waiting for some specified event. If a process is 
removed from the suspended state and placed in the secure halt state, then it must also be 
removed from the queue in which it was waiting. What should then be done when the 
I/O event completes? Does the next process in the queue get the event? Is the event 
discarded? In either case the event will be lost to the process. What should be done 
when the process departs the secure halt state and is returned to the suspended state? Is it 
requeued for the I/O event? Determining how to handle this would be difficult. 
110 or event completion 
Figure 4. Fully Connected Secure Halt Entry 
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A process in the ready state, and by extension in the ready queue, could easily be 
removed from and replaced into the ready state and queue. A process in the running state 
could be removed from the processor, enter the secure halt state, and the scheduler 
allowed to select a new process from the ready queue to move to the running state. 
Difficulties may arise, however, when several processes that were formerly running are 
removed from the secure halt state simultaneously. A decision must be made as to which 
one will be selected to run, while the others are sent to the ready queue. This decision 
could be made by the scheduler since this is exactly the type of decision that the 
scheduler is designed to make. However this does not address the problem of returning a 
process to the suspended state. These problems render this fully connected solution 
unacceptable. 
3.        Single Entry Secure Halt State Process Lifecycle 
A second solution is shown in Figure 5. 
ISO or event completion I/O or event wait 
Figure 5. Single Entry/Exit Secure Halt State 
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This solution allows entry to the secure halt state from the ready state, and 
departure from the secure halt state to the ready state. This is accomplished by having a 
secure halt router to decide which processes to route to the secure halt state. The secure 
halt router will send processes that are not secure halted on to the scheduler. Since the 
scheduler must analyze each process while making its scheduling decisions, the 
additional check does not change the locus of decision-making. The scheduler normally 
acts as a "gatekeeper" to enter the running state. The secure halt router acts as a 
gatekeeper to the scheduler. 
This solution implies that a request to enter the secure halt state will not be 
immediately granted. It will be deferred until the process comes up for scheduling. 
Enabling this deferral requires a secure halt flag. The flag will be set when a request is 
received to secure halt the process. The secure halt router, seeing a set flag, will send the 
process to the secure halt state. If the flag is not set the secure halt router will send the 
process to the scheduler. When a request is received to remove a process from the secure 
halt state, the secure halt flag is cleared and the process is returned to the ready state and 
queue. 
This solution solves the problem of the suspended state. A request to enter the 
secure halt state for a process in the suspended state will result in the secure halt flag 
being set. The process will continue to wait until the I/O or event is complete. It will 
then take its normal path to the ready state and queue, where the secure halt router will 
perform as explained above. A critical issue is ensuring that I/O destined for a process 
that has been secure halted, will not be sent to another process instead. This would create 
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confusion as well as a major security concern. Since the process has waited for its I/O 
event, it will receive the I/O data, not some other process. 
It raises a new problem: what to do with a process in the running state. When a 
secure halt request is received, the process cannot be allowed to continue executing. 
Setting its secure halt flag and immediately invoking the scheduler solves this. The 
currently running process will then take its normal path to the ready state and queue, 
where the secure halt router will perform as explained above. Most modern operating 
systems, such as Windows NT [SOL98] and Linux [BEC98], have an idle process that 
executes when no other processes are ready. Thus we are guaranteed that the scheduler 
can find a process that has not been secure halted. 
B.        SECURE HALT FLAG 
As mentioned in the section on Single Entry Secure Halt State Process Lifecycle, 
a system that supports a secure halt state will require the addition of a secure halt flag to 
each process control block. When a process is in the new state, i.e. it is being created, the 
secure halt flag is initialized to "cleared." When it is requested that a process enter the 
secure halt state, the secure halt flag must be set. A new code module, the 
Secure_Halt_Routing_Module must guarantee that it will send to the secure halt state any 
process it finds in the ready queue with its secure halt flag set. When it is requested that a 
process depart the secure halt state, its secure halt flag must be cleared prior to its return 
to the ready queue. Another new module, the Secure_Halt_Module is the part of the 
operating system responsible setting and clearing the secure halt flag. 
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C.       SECURE HALT MECHANISM MODULES 
This section describes the modules required to support the process secure halt 
mechanism. In this context, the term "module" refers to an active part of the system that 
manages a particular database or flow of control. 
1.        Secure_HaIt_ModuIe 
The Secure_Halt_Module is responsible for controlling a process' entry and exit 
from the secure halt state. It provides a single point of entry for interfacing with the 
secure halt mechanism. The Secure_Halt_Module will provide the following interface: 
• A function for initializing a process' secure halt state. 
• A function that returns whether or not a process is in the secure halt state. 
• A function for setting a process into the secure halt state. This function must 
also determine if the process is currently executing. If so it must call the 
scheduler to remove the process from execution. 
• A function for removing a process from the secure halt state. This function 
must determine if the process is in the secure halt state. If so, it must send the 
process to the ready state and queue. 
2.        Secure_Halt_Session_Module 
A session is defined as a group of processes that will be managed together. The 
Secure_Halt_Session_Module is responsible for controlling a session's entry and exit 
from the secure halt state. It provides a single point of entry for sessions interfacing with 
the secure halt mechanism. This is equivalent to a process family on an XTS-300 system 
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or the processes assigned to a virtual terminal in Linux. The 
Secure_Halt_Session_Module will provide the following interface: 
• A function for querying if all the processes in a session have been secure 
halted. 
• A function for secure halting a session. This function must guarantee that is 
sets the secure halt flag of each member of the session to be halted. 
Furthermore, is must guarantee that a currently executing process that is part 
of the session will be immediately removed from the running state. If so it 
must call the scheduler to remove the process from execution. 
• A function for secure unhalting a session. 
3.        Secure_HaIt_Routing_ModuIe 
The Secure_Halt_Routing_Module is responsible for ensuring that a process with 
its secure halt flag set that is about to be examined by the scheduler, will instead be sent 
to the secure halt state. A process with its secure halt flag cleared will be sent to the 
scheduler for normal processing. 
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III.    LINUX MODIFICATIONS 
This chapter describes the modifications that must be made to the Linux kernel to 
support the design proposed in Chapter II. 
A.       PROCESS STATES IN LINUX 
Once again the starting point will be analyzing process states, this time in a Linux 
system, as shown in Figure 6. 
creation 
End of i/o 
Figure 6. Linux Process State Diagram [CAR98] 
These states are defined as follows: 
• Ready - A process that is ready to run. It is waiting for the scheduler to 
assign it to a processor. 
• Executing - A process that is executing on a processor. This is the only state 
in which a process is actually "doing" something. 
• Suspended - A process is waiting on some input/output or event. This could 
be keyboard input from the user, a disk read, etc. 
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• Zombie - A process that has completed its execution. A process will remain 
in the terminated state until the operating system has determined that the 
process' information is no longer needed 
• Stopped - A process has been halted by some other process [CAR98]. The 
other process can restart the halted process as necessary. The stopped state is 
usually used by a debugger as it is stepping through a program. 
1.        Comparison of Standard Process States with Linux' Implementation 
A comparison of Figure 6 with Figure 3 is shown in Table 1. 







Table 1. Generic O/S vs. Linux Process States 
While Linux does not have a "new" state, it does recognize that a process in the 
midst of creation does not fall into one of the other states. Of note is Linux' addition of a 
stopped state. In the stopped state, a process is unable to proceed until restarted by a 
controlling process. Since the controlling element is a process, and therefore, in user 
space, the stopped state is not acceptable as a substitute for our concept of a secure halt 
state. Control of entry to and exit from the secure halt state must reside in the kernel. 
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Linux cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered a secure operating system. 
Nevertheless, potentially allowing control of the secure halt mechanism from outside the 
kernel would not be a good design decision. A better design would be to have a new 
method of implementing a secure halt mechanism that depends on a minimal amount of 
current mechanisms [SCH75]. 
Linux further subdivides the waiting state into two sub states: interruptible and 
non-interruptible [MAX99]. In the interruptible state, the process is waiting for an event. 
However, sending it a signal may wake it up. Signals are the Linux implementation of 
inter-process communication [BEC98]. There are signals to kill a process, to wakeup a 
process, etc. In the uninterruptible state, the waiting process may not be woken up by a 
software signal. It will remain in the waiting state until some hardware condition occurs. 
2.        Actual Linux Kernel Implementation of Process States 
The Linux kernel defines a process through a task_struct defined in the file 
"include/sched.h" [TOR92b]. Each process, upon creation, has a task_struct allocated to 
it. One of the members of the taskjstruct is the state variable. The state variable, which 
is a long integer, is supposed to be assigned one of the defined process states. The Linux 
kernel defines process states in the header file, "include/sched.h" [TOR92b]. These 







• TASK_SWAPPING - this state is never assigned to the state variable. 
The above list does not include something like "TASK_READY." This is 
because all tasks that are ready to run are assigned the TASKJRUNNTNG state. They are 
all placed in the ready_queue. When the scheduler selects a process to run on a 
processor, it is not removed from the ready_queue. Nor is its state variable changed 
from TASK_RUNNTNG. Instead, its has_cpu flag, also declared in the task_struct, is 
set. The net result is that a process is in the ready state if and only if the following 
conditions are true: 
• Its state variable is set to TASK_RUNNTNG. 
• It is in the ready_queue. 
• Its has_cpu flag is cleared. 
A process is in the running state if and only if: 
• Its state variable is set to TASK_RUNNTNG. 
• It is in the ready_queue. 
• Its has_cpu flag is set. 
Thus, although a process' state variable is never set to some "ready" value, the Linux 
kernel does have a ready state, albeit a virtual one. 
3.        Linux Kernel Process State References 
A search of the kernel source using the Linux Cross Reference [GLEOO] gave 
results shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Process State Access Search Results 
Scrutinizing some of the actual references shows that many of them involve the 
modification of a process' state variable. This is a gross violation of the philosophy of 
limiting changes to a few, well-specified modules. Attempting to implement the secure 
halt state as a new legal value to assign to a process' state variable would not be very 
secure. This leaves the following problem: how to implement the secure halt state in 
code? 
B.        ADDING THE SECURE HALT FLAG AND STATE 
1.        Adding the Secure Halt Flag 
Recall that the secure halt flag signifies that a process must not be placed in the 
running state, and that it must be diverted to the secure halt state by the secure halt 
routing module prior to reaching the scheduler. As stated in the high-level design in 
Chapter n, the secure halt flag is used to notify the secure halt routing module that a 
process in the ready_queue must be sent to the secure halt state. The simplest location 
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to place the flag, which is required for each process, is in the task_struct assigned to 
each process. Therefore, the secure halt flag was added to the task_struct. Also, code 
was added to the initialization of the task_struct so that a process is created with its 
secure halt flag cleared. 
2.        Adding the Secure Halt State 
Returning to the problem of implementing a secure halt state, a solution presents 
itself that is an extension of the manner in which Linux implements the ready and 
running states. A process can be said to be in the secure halt state if and only if all of the 
following conditions are true: 
• Its state variable is set to TASK_RUNNING. 
• It is in the ready_queue. 
• Its has_cpu flag is cleared. 
• Its secure halt flag is set. 
This approach has an important benefit. It makes use of a new addition to a 
process' task_struct: the secure halt flag. Since this new flag is unknown to the rest of 
the kernel, a well-defined interface, the secure halt module, can be used to centralize 
access to the flag. 
C.       SECURE HALT MECHANISM MODULES 
This section describes the modules required to support the secure halt mechanism. 
Critical to the module implementation is an understanding of the potential for the Linux 
kernel to be multi-threaded. One of the choices to make when compiling the Linux 
kernel is whether or not to enable symmetric multi-processing (SMP) support. SMP 
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support allows the kernel to make full use of multiple processors on SMP-compliant 
hardware. However, this means that the kernel's data structures, including the process' 
task_struct, and the ready_queue, must be protected from simultaneous attempts at 
modification. This is accomplished through the classical use of locks and semaphores. A 
primary consideration in designing these modules is that they each specialize in one area 
of the secure halt mechanism [PAR72]. 
1.        Secure Halt Module 
The secure halt module provides functions for: 
• Querying a process' secure halt status. 
• Placing a process in the secure halt state. 
• Removing a process from the secure halt state. 
The second and third functions modify the secure halt flag in a process' taskjstruct. 
Therefore, they must properly lock the taskjist while making their modifications. The 
taskjist is a list containing all tasks in the system, regardless of their current state. 
These functions must also ensure that they release their lock on the taskjist when 
completed. 
Also critical is the need to deal with a request to secure halt a process that is 
running. This requires, in addition to the standard behavior, that the function call the 
scheduler to immediately cause it to perform scheduling. This will ensure that the 
process is removed from the running state. 
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2.        Secure Halt Session Module 
While the secure halt module is responsible for managing the secure halt status of 
individual processes, the secure halt session module is responsible for managing the 
secure halt status of entire sessions. Linux supports the concept of virtual terminals. A 
typical Linux system has six virtual terminals. Each virtual terminal has the ability to 
manage one user login. Thus in the typical system six users, or the same user six times, 
or any combination, can be logged-in to a Linux system from one keyboard and monitor. 
Each of these virtual terminals has a unique session ID associated with it. Furthermore, 
each process created in support of a virtual terminal has the session variable of its 
task_struct set to the virtual terminal's session ID. 
The secure halt session module provides functions for: 
• Querying a session's secure halt status. 
• Placing a session in the secure halt state. 
• Removing a session from the secure halt state. 
Note that a session is in the secure halt state if and only if all processes that are part of 
that session are in the secure halt state. 
The most straightforward way to implement the functions of the secure halt 
session module would be to iterate through the taskjist and call the matching function in 
the secure halt module for each process that is part of the session in question. However, 
this is not the most efficient approach. Recall that the secure halt modules modification 
functions lock and unlock the taskjist while performing their work. For a session 
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containing multiple processes, this would result in multiple attempts to lock and unlock 
the taskjist. 
The approach actually implemented is to have the secure halt session module's 
modification functions lock the taskjist, iterate through the taskjist, modify the secure 
halt flag for processes that are part of the session in question, and release the lock on the 
taskjist. While this approach improves efficiency, it does so at the cost of a layered 
design. Once again special attention was paid to ensure that if a process that is part of a 
session being secure halted is running, that the scheduler will be called to remove it from 
the running state. 
3.        Secure Halt Routing Module 
Implementation of the secure halt routing module requires an understanding of the 
Linux scheduler. 
a. The Linux Scheduler 
The Linux scheduler selects a process in the ready state and places it in the 
running state. The actual algorithm used by the scheduler can be changed and is 
irrelevant to the current discussion. The scheduler iterates through the ready queue 
searching for processes that are schedulable. The definition of a schedulable process 
depends on whether the kernel is compiled with or without SMP support. 
If the kernel is compiled without SMP support, then a schedulable process 
is defined as any process in the ready_queue. Even if a process is currently on the one, 
and only processor, it can potentially be selected for continued execution. If the kernel is 
compiled with SMP support, then a schedulable process is defined as any process in the 
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ready_queue that is not currently running on another processor. It would not be efficient 
to force a process off of one processor because another one has selected it. 
Once the scheduler has determined that a process is schedulable, it 
computes a "goodness" value. The goodness value represents a way of deciding which 
process is the most suitable for selection to run. If the process currently being examined 
by the scheduler has a higher goodness than previously seen, it is selected as the potential 
winner of the selection process. This goes on until the scheduler has examined all 
processes in the ready queue. The scheduler then declares the potential winner the actual 
winner and proceeds to place it into the running state. 
b.        Adding The Secure Halt Routing Module 
Given the proposed implementation of the secure halt flag and state, 
implementation of the secure halt routing module is straightforward. Recall the secure 
halt router's task: ensure that the scheduler cannot place a process in the secure halt state 
into the running state. Decision-making by the secure halt routing module can take place 
within the scheduler. If the module's decision-making code is collocated with the 
scheduler's determination of a schedulable process, then it can properly ensure that the 
scheduler cannot select a securely halted process for execution. 
The decision-making code consists of calling the secure halt module's 
query function for the process being tested for schedulability. If the process has been 
secure halted, then it will not be analyzed by the scheduler and, therefore, will not be 
selected for execution. 
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IV.    CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this research was to add a mechanism allowing the Linux operating 
system to halt processes in a security-related manner. This mechanism provides key 
functionality necessary for future design and implementation of a trusted path. This 
chapter details the progress made toward this goal, the problems encountered, and areas 
of future research. 
A. PROGRESS MADE 
The secure halt mechanism was successfully added to the Linux operating system. 
The SECURE_HALT_MODULE and the SECURE_HALT_SESSION_MODULE were 
both fully implemented. A testing framework, as described in Appendix C, was designed 
to test the efficacy of the design. It was confirmed that all processes that were part of a 
session that had been halted were no longer able to execute until subsequently unhalted. 
B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
The primary problem was the need to understand how the Linux kernel handled 
the scheduling of processes and how it defined process states. Unfortunately, the Linux 
kernel makes heavy use of "goto" statements and global variables. These make 
understanding the logical flow difficult. The most useful tool for finding the declaration 
and use of variables was the Linux Cross Reference [GLEOO]. 
Additionally, the usual difficulties were encountered when developing at the 
operating system level. While compiling the kernel source code is straightforward, it 
requires several steps that must be carefully followed [WAR01]. The complete 
turn-around time for making a small change to the kernel, compiling, rebooting, testing 
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the new kernel, and rebooting back to the development environment took an average of 
20 minutes. Furthermore, as a debugger cannot be used on the kernel, it was necessary to 
use the kernel printing facility, printk, to generate debugging traces and view variable 
values. This was not a very efficient procedure, but it was all that was available. 
One helpful configuration was to have the development Linux installation share a 
common boot partition with the secure halt mechanism test Linux installation. This 
greatly simplified installation of the newly compiled kernel. 
It may be possible to reduce the turn-around time by developing on a computer 
running VMware. VMware is a software program that sits between the hardware and the 
operating system. It allows multiple virtual machines, i.e. installations of an operating 
system, to run concurrently. Each machine thinks it is running directly on the hardware. 
Developing on such a system would allow development on one virtual machine and 
testing on another. The testing machine could be rebooted without disturbing the 
development machine. [VMW01] 
An examination was made into the feasibility of modifying the ps command so it 
will display the secure halt status of processes (see Future Research). Several attempts 
were made to compile the original source code, without modification [JOH00]. These 
attempts were unsuccessful and the examination was terminated. 
C.       FUTURE RESEARCH 
1.        Trusted Path 
The secure halt mechanism was developed as a support mechanism for adding a 
trusted path to Linux. The difficulty in adding a trusted path will center on performing 
32 
I/O from within the kernel. Currently, the kernel print command, printk, can be used to 
display output to the user from within the kernel. No comparable command exists for 
accepting input from the user. A possible solution may be found in capturing all 
keystrokes at the keyboard driver level when the trusted path has been invoked. Solving 
the input problem would go a long way toward designing a functional trusted path for 
Linux. 
2. Disabling I/O Buffering 
When a session is suspended, even though none of the processes belonging to the 
session can execute, the keyboard I/O queue continues to buffer keystrokes. All of the 
keystrokes entered for a session while the session is secure halted are buffered and given 
to the session when it is unhalted. While this is not as dangerous as if the keystrokes 
were being given to an incorrect process, it is not a desired behavior. Research should be 
done into how the keyboard I/O queue buffers keystrokes and how to stop this from 
happening for a session while it is secure halted. 
3. ps Command 
The ps command, which displays process status information, should be modified 
so it is able to display the secure halt status of each process. Given that the secure halt 
mechanism has been added in kernel-space and the ps command executes in user-space, 
enabling this functionality will require determining how to export the secure halt state 
information to a location accessible to the ps command and importing the data into the ps 
command. A cursory examination of the source code showed that the ps command 
gathers it information by parsing information stored in the /proc directory for each 
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process. Logically, adding the secure halt state information to the data written by the 
kernel into the /proc directory should go a long way to adding this functionality. 
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APPENDIX A. MODULE DESIGN 
A. SECURE HALT COMMON TYPES MODULE 






This module defines the interface of the Secure_Halt_Module described in 
Chapter HI. This module does not depend on any other modules. 
External Constants: 
• SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS 





1.        init_secure_halt 
a.        Processing 
Sets p's secure_halted flag so that a call to is_secure_halted will return 
SEC_HALT_FALSE. 
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• p - the process which needs its secure halt flag initialized. 
d. Outputs 
• <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if p's securejialted flag was 
properly initialized, 
o    SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is 
NULL. 
2.        is_secure_halted 
a. Processing 
Checks the status of the securejialt flag. 





•    p - the process whose secure halt flag is being questioned. 
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d.        Outputs 
•    <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_TRUE if p's secure_halted flag is set. 
o   SEC_HALT_FALSE if p' s secure_halted flag is not set. 
o   SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is 
NULL. 
3.        secure_halt_task 
a. Processing 
Sets p's secure_halted flag so that a call to is_secure_halted will return 
SEC_HALT_TRUE. If p is currently executing, this function calls the scheduler to 
remove p from execution. 





• p - the process which is to have its secure_halted flag set. 
d. Outputs 
• <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if p's securejialted flag was 
successfully set. 
37 
o   SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is 
NULL. 
4.        secure_unhalt_task 
a. Processing 
Sets p's securejhalted flag so that a call to is_secure_halted will return 






p - the process which is to have its secure_halted flag cleared. • 
d. Outputs 
•    <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if p's secure_halted flag was 
properly cleared, 
o   SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is 
NULL. 
C.       SECURE_HALT_SESSION_MODULE 
This module defines the interface of the Secure_Halt_Session_Module described 









1.        is_secure_halted_session 
a. Processing 
Iterates through the taskjist. For each task, p, whose session number 
matches the input parameter, it checks is_secure_halted(p). If all such processes return 
SEC_HALT_TRUE, this function returns SEC_HALT_TRUE. If at least one of the 
processes returns SEC_HALT_FALSE, this function returns SEC_HALT_FALSE. If no 
process in the task list has a session number matching the input parameter, this function 
returns SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION. 





•    session - the session whose processes are being queried as to their 
secure_halted flag status. 
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d. Outputs 
•    <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_TRUE if every process in the input session 
has its secure_halted flag set. 
o   SEC_HALT_FALSE if not every process in the input 
session has its secure_halted flag set. 
o   SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION if the input 
session is not a valid session ID. 
2.        secure_halt_session 
a. Processing 
Iterates through the taskjist. For each task, p, whose session number 
matches the input parameter, it calls secure_halt_task(p). If any of the tasks is currently 
executing on a processor, the Scheduler_Module's schedule() function is called to 
immediately perform scheduling. If no process in the task list has a session number 
matching the input parameter, this function returns 
SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION. Otherwise this function returns 
SEC_HALT_SUCCESS. 






• session - the session whose processes are having their 
secure_halted flag set. 
d. Outputs 
• <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if every process in the input 
session has its secure_halted flag successfully set. 
o   SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION if the input 
session is not a valid session ID. 
3.        secure_unhalt_session 
a. Processing 
Iterates through the task_list. For each task, p, whose session number 
matches the input parameter, it calls secure_unhalt_task(p). If no process in the task list 
has a session number matching the input parameter, this function returns 
SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION. Otherwise this function returns 
SEC_HALT_SUCCESS. 






• session - the session whose processes are having their 
secure_halted flag cleared. 
d. Outputs 
• <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if every process in session has its 
secure_halted flag successfully cleared. 
o   SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION if session is 
not a valid session ID. 
D.        SECURE_HALT_ROUTING_MODULE 
This module defines the interface of the Secure_Halt_Routing_Module described 
in Chapter DI. 
External Entry Point 
•    schedulable 
1.        schedulable 
a. Processing 
Queries the process' is_secure_halted result. If the result is 
SEC_HALT_FALSE, the process is not sent to the scheduler. Otherwise, the process is 
sent to the scheduler. 
42 





• p - the process which is to be checked for schedulability. 
d. Outputs 
• <function result> 
o   SEC_HALT_TRUE if p's secure_halted flag is set. 
o   SEC_HALT_FALSE if p's secure_halted flag is not set. 




APPENDIX B. SOURCE CODE 
This appendix contains the source code enabling a secure halt mechanism in 
Linux. The secure halt mechanism was implemented on version 2.2.18 of the Linux 
kernel. Each section is devoted to a module with each subsection corresponding to 
individual source and header files. 
A.       SECURE HALT COMMON TYPE MODULE 
1.        include/linux/secure_halt_types.h 
/* 
******************************************************************** 
* File:   include/linux/secure_halt_types.h 
* 
* Description: 
* This file contains types and constants that are common to all 
* Secure Halt modules. 
* 





#define SEC_HALT_TRUE  (1) 
#define SEC_HALT_FALSE (0) 
#define SEC_HALT_SUCCESS (0) 
#endif /* defined(_SECURE_HALT_TYPES_H) */ 
B.       SECURE_HALT_MODULE 
1.        include/linux/sched.h 
•    Added 
#include <linux/secure_halt_types.h> 
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• Added to task_struct 
struct task_struct { 
/* secure halt flag */ 
int secure_halted:l; 
}; 
• Added to INITTASK 
#define  INIT_TASK  \ 
/*   sec   halt   */      SEC_HALT_FALSE,    \ 
} 
2.        include/linux/secure_halt.h 
/* 
******************************************************************** 
* File: include/linux/secure_halt.h 
* 
* Description: 
* This is the header file for code which places tasks into 
* and out of the secure halt mode. 
* 













* p        The task whose state is being checked. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  SEC_HALT_TRUE if p is secure halted. 
* SEC_HALT_FALSE if p is not secure halted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is NULL. 
* Description: 
* Returns whether a specified process is secure halted. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 
extern  inline  int is_secure_halted(struct task_struct *p){ 
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if (p == NULL){ 
return(SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS); 
} 












* p        The task which is being secure halted. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if p was successfully halted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is NULL 
* Description: 
* Sets a task's secure halt flag.  If the task is 
* currently executing, this call will call the scheduler, which 
* will swap out the task. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 






* p        The process which is being secure unhalted. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if p was successfully unhalted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is NULL 
* Description: 
* Clears a task's secure halt flag. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 
extern int secure_unhalt_task(struct task_struct *p); 
#endif /* defined(_SECURE_HALT_H) */ 
3.        kernel/secure_halt.c 
/* 
******************************************************************** 




* This is the implementation file for code which places tasks 
* into and out of the secure halt mode. 
* 









* p        The task which is being secure halted. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if p was successfully halted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is NULL 
* Description: 
* Sets a task's secure halt flag.  If the task is 
* currently executing, this call will call the scheduler, which 
* will swap out the task. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 
int secure_halt_task(struct task_struct *p){ 




p->secure_halted = SEC_HALT_TRUE; 
write_unlock(&tasklist_lock); 
if (p == current){ 










* p        The process which is being secure unhalted. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if p was successfully unhalted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_PROCESS if p is NULL 
* Description: 




int secure_unhalt_task(struct task_struct *p){ 








C.       SECURE_HALT_SESSION_MODULE 
1.        include/linux/secure_ha!t_session.h 
/* 
******************************************************************** 
* File: include/linux/secure_halt_session.h 
* 
* Description: 
* This is the header file for code which places sessions into 
* and out of the secure halt mode. 
* 










* session  The session whose state is being checked. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  zero if any process in the specified session is not 
* secure halted, any other value if all processes in 
* the specified session are secure halted. 
* Description: 
* Returns whether a specified session is secure halted. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 











* Places a session in the secure halt mode.  All tasks belonging 
* to the specified session will be secure halted.  If any of the 
* tasks are currently executing, this function will call the 
* scheduler, which will swap out the tasks. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 










* Removes a session from the secure halt mode.  All tasks 
* belonging to the specified session will be secure unhalted. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 
extern int secure_unhalt_session(int session); 
#endif /* defined(_SECURE_HALT_SESSION_H) */ 
2.        kerneI/secure_halt_session.c 
/* 
******************************************************************** 
* File: kernel/secure_halt_session.c 
* 
* Description: 
* This is the implementation file for code which places sessions 
* into and out of the secure halt mode. 
* 












* session The session whose tasks are being checked. 
* Outputs: 
* <result> SEC_HALT_TRUE if every task in session is 
* secure halted. 
* SEC_HALT_FALSE if every task in session is not 
* secure halted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION if session is not a 
* valid session ID. 
* Description: 
* Returns whether all tasks in a session are secure halted. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 
int is_secure_halted_session(int session){ 
struct task_struct *p; 
int found_session = SEC_HALT_FALSE; 
for_each_task(p){ 
if (p->session == session){ 
found_session = SEC_HALT_TRUE; 
















* session  The session whose tasks are being secure halted. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if every task in session was 
* secure halted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION if session is not a 
* valid session ID. 
* Description: 
* Places a session in the secure halt mode.  All tasks belonging 
* to the specified session will be secure halted.  If any of the 




int secure_halt_session(int session){ 
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// This does not call secure_halt_task for efficiency reasons, i.e 
//we only want one call to lock and unlock the task list 
int proc_is_executing = SEC_HALT_FALSE; 
struct task_struct *p; 
int found_session = SEC_HALT_FALSE; 
write_lock(&tasklist_lock); 
for_each_task(p){ 
if (p->session == session){ 
p->secure_halted = SEC_HALT_TRUE; 
found_session = SEC_HALT_TRUE; 
if (p == current){ 





if (proc_is_executing == SEC_HALT_TRUE){ 
schedule(); 
} 











* session  The session whose tasks are being secure unhalted. 
* Outputs: 
* <result>  SEC_HALT_SUCCESS if every task in session was 
* secure unhalted. 
* SEC_HALT_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION if session is not a 
* valid session ID. 
* Description: 
* Removes a session in the secure halt mode.  All tasks belonging 
* to the specified session will be secure unhalted. 
•••••A************************************************************** 
*/ 
int secure_unhalt_session(int session){ 
// This does not call secure_unhalt_task for efficiency reasons, 
i .e 
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//we only want one call to lock and unlock the task list. 
struct task_struct *p; 
int found_session = SEC_HALT_FALSE; 
write_lock(&tasklist_lock); 
for_each_task(p){ 
if (p->session == session){ 
found_session = SEC_HALT_TRUE; 











D.       SECURE_HALT_ROUTING_MODULE 
The SECURE_HALT_ROUTING_MODULE is implemented by adding code to 
the existing Linux scheduler [TOR92a]. 
1.        kernel/sched.c 
a. Added 
#include <linux/secure_halt.h> 
b. Changed the scheduleQ function 
•    From: 
while (p != &init_task) { 
if (can_schedule(p)) 
{ 
int weight = goodness(prev, p, this_cpu); 
if (weight > c) 
c = weight, next = p; 
} 




while (p != &init_task) { 
if ((is_secure_halted(p) != SEC_HALT_TRUE) 
&& (can_schedule(p))) 
{ 
int weight = goodness(prev, p, this_cpu); 
if (weight > c) 
c = weight, next = p; 
} 
p = p->next_run; 
} 
54 
APPENDIX C. TESTING FRAMEWORK 
A.       GOAL 
The goal in developing a testing framework was to enable a user to selectively 
halt and unhalt the session associated with a given virtual terminal. The framework 
consisted of adding a new option to the "magic system request" facility and creating a 
module that toggles the session on the current virtual terminal into and out of the secure 
halt state. The magic system request facility is a specific combination of keystrokes that 
the keyboard driver reroutes to the SYSTEM_REQUEST module for processing instead 
of passing them through the usual path [MAR77]. The magic system request key 
combination is "Alt-SysRq" and the specific system request option. The option added for 
the testing framework was "Alt-SysRq-X." 
B.        SOURCE CODE 
1.        drivers/char/sysrq.c 
a. Added 
#include <linux/secure_halt_test.h> 
b. Added to function handle jsysrq 
switch   (key)   { 









* File: include/linux/secure_halt_test.h 
* 
* Description: 
* This is the header file for code which tests the operation of 
* the secure halt mechanism. 
* 











* tty      The tty whose processes are having their secure halt 




* Toggles the secure halt state of processes that are part of the 
* specified tty's session.  If the session is currently secure 
* halted, it will be unhalted, and vice versa. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 
void toggle_tty_secure_halt(struct tty_struct *tty); 
#endif /* defined(_SECURE_HALT_TEST_H) */ 
3.   drivers/char/secure_halt_test.c 
/* 
******************************************************************** 
* File: drivers/char/secure_halt_test.c 
* 
* Description: 
* This is the implementation file for code which tests the 
* operation of the secure halt mechanism. 
* 







#include <linux/secure halt session.h> 
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#include <linux/secure_halt_test.h> 






* tty      The tty whose processes are having their secure halt 




* Toggles the secure halt state of processes that are part of the 
* specified tty's session.  If the session is currently secure 
* halted, it will be unhalted, and vice versa. 
******************************************************************** 
*/ 
void toggle_tty_secure_halt(struct tty_struct *tty){ 
static time_t last_invocation = 0; 
int tty_num = MINOR(tty->device) ; 
time_t curr_time = CURRENT_TIME; 
/* only allow invocation every so many seconds */ 
if ((curr_time - last_invocation) < INTER_INVOCATION_SEC){ 
return; 
} 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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